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WHO ARE MY REAL MOMMY AND DADDY?  THIRD-PARTY 
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS AND THE NEED FOR 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE IN NORTH DAKOTA WITH THIS 
POLICY-LADEN AREA OF LAW 
ABSTRACT 
 
Children are increasingly being raised by persons other than their 
biological or adoptive parents.  When disputes arise between parents and 
third parties seeking custody, there are many of the traditional child custody 
dynamics at play, but also some unique ones.  North Dakota has judicially 
crafted the means and standards by which a third party may petition for 
custody of a child.  Due to the highly sensitive nature of assigning rights 
and responsibilities with regard to the care of children, the North Dakota 
Legislative Assembly should give the courts of North Dakota statutory 
guidance on how third parties can gain custody of a minor child.  By using 
the experiences of other states and the American Law Institute’s guidance 
on the subject, the Legislature should craft law that will aid trial and 
appellate courts in this highly sensitive area. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite past notions of family, a significant number of children in the 
United States are not living with both of their biological parents.1  The 
incidence of children living in households with an adult who is not that 
child’s biological parent is also significant.2  North Dakota is not immune 
from the phenomenon of children being raised by persons other than their 
biological parents.3  When parents seek to regain custody of their children 
from third parties that had been raising the children, it is not a 
straightforward decision as to whether the parent should regain the custody 
of his or her child.4  The extent to which the third party remains in the 
child’s life is also often disputed.5  The law surrounding these types of 
claims is anything but certain, and North Dakota statutes provide little 
guidance.6 
 
1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILY AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:  2011, 
tbl.C9 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2011/tabC1-
all.xls (showing only sixty-nine percent of children in United States are living with both parents). 
2. See id. (showing 8.3% of children in the United States live in a household with at least one 
stepparent, grandparent, or other non-parent, excluding adoptive parents). 
3. KAREN OLSON, N.D. KIDS COUNT, NORTH DAKOTA KIDS COUNT 2011 FACT BOOK 11 
(2011), available at http://www.ndkidscount.org/factbook/completefactbook/NDKCFact 
Book_2011.pdf  (noting that four percent of children in North Dakota live with a grandparent 
alone, and that only seventy-two percent of North Dakota children live with both parents). 
4. See McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 31, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662-64 (Crothers, J., 
concurring) (surveying North Dakota cases on the subject). 
5. See id. 
6. North Dakota has specific language applying to custody that was adopted in 2009.  See 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-00.1 (2009).  Rather than using those definitions, throughout this Note, 
the term custody will be used, referring to physical custody, now known in North Dakota as 
primary residential responsibility, and visitation will be used, which is now known as parenting 
time.  See id. §§ 14-09-00.1(5)-(6), 14-09-33.  The use of the term custody for third parties is 
intentional, in part, for the reason set forth later concerning standing.  See discussion infra Part 
IV.A. 
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This Note reviews the United States Supreme Court precedent 
articulating the constitutional rights that parents have at stake in any 
proceeding between a parent and a third party, reviews the statutory law and 
case law in North Dakota concerning third party custody claims in North 
Dakota, and draws upon other states’ experiences and the American Law 
Institute’s guidance on providing a clear statute to guide both litigants and 
courts in making determinations that are both fair to parents and beneficial 
to children. 
II. PARENTING IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Parents have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their 
children.7  The history, refinement, and current questionable status of 
parental rights are analyzed in this section.  Part A looks at the Supreme 
Court’s early articulation of parental rights.  Part B examines at the 
Supreme Court’s refinement of parental rights over time.  Finally, Part C 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s most recent case on parental rights and shows 
that things are not quite as clear as many people once thought. 
A. MEYER AND PIERCE MAKE THE FIRST FORAY INTO 
 PARENTAL RIGHTS 
The Supreme Court’s first recognition of the fundamental nature of 
parental rights occurred in 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,8 in response to a 
question regarding the education of children.9  In Meyer, a parochial school 
teacher was found guilty of violating a Nebraska statute, which criminalized 
teaching a student in a language other than English.10  The teacher 
challenged the prohibition as a violation of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.11  The Nebraska Supreme Court defended the 
prohibition on security and pedagogical concerns of the state, and found the 
restriction on teaching foreign languages a proper exercise of police power 
and not a violation of due process.12 
The United States Supreme Court reversed Meyer’s conviction, 
holding the criminal statute was applied arbitrarily and did not have a 
reasonable relation to a proper state interest.13  The Court found the liberty 
interests of the teacher were implicated in such a prohibition, but more 
 
7. E.g., McAllister, ¶ 14, 779 N.W.2d at 658. 
8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
9. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97. 
10. Id. 
11. See id. at 397. 
12. Id. at 397-99 (quoting Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (Neb. 1923)). 
13. Id. at 403. 
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importantly, that the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” and “the power 
of parents to control the education of their own.”14  The Court did not rely 
solely on the basis of the parents’ “essential” rights to control the education 
of their children, but also on the right of a modern language teacher to 
practice his occupation, and of citizens to speak languages other than 
English.15  Thus, while not a case squarely dealing with a parent’s rights, 
Meyer stands as the first pronouncement that a parent’s authority over a 
child is one of the “fundamental rights which must be respected” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.16 
The Supreme Court readdressed the issue of parental rights in an 
educational context two years later in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the 
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.17  In Pierce, the Supreme Court held 
parents cannot be forced to send their children to a public, as opposed to a 
private or parochial, school.18  In 1922, the voters of Oregon passed the 
Compulsory Education Act, which made failure to send a child between age 
eight and sixteen to a public school a misdemeanor for any parent or 
custodian of that child.19  Both a Catholic school system, the Society of the 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary (“Society of Sisters”), and a 
military academy, Hill Military Academy, sought an injunction against 
enforcement of the Act, as it would irreparably destroy their business, 
having no student enrollment.20  Although no parents were parties to the 
suits, the Society of Sisters did run an orphanage, and would have fallen 
under the Act’s prohibition as custodian of children.21  Unlike the Court in 
Meyer, the Pierce Court squarely placed its holding on the implication of 
parents’ right to control their children.22  The Court wrote “the Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct 
the upbringing and education of children under their control.”23  The Court 
focused on parental rights despite being invited by the Society of Sisters to 
 
14. Id. at 399, 401. 
15. See id. at 401-03. 
16. Id. at 401; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”:  Meyer and 
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1012-16 (1992) (noting that the 
litigants and the state courts focused on claims of religious freedom and freedom of educators to 
practice their occupation, not primarily on the rights of parents to direct the education of their 
children). 
17. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
18. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
19. Id. at 530-31. 
20. Id. at 531-33. 
21. See id. at 532. 
22. Id. at 534-35. 
23. Id. 
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invalidate the Act on the other interests implicated in Meyer.24  The most 
lasting impact of Pierce has been the idea that the child is not primarily 
identified with the state, but rather, the family.25  The Court wrote “[t]he 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct 
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”26 
B. THE INTEREST OF PARENTS BECOMES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, 
 OR IS IT A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST? 
The rights of parents concerning their children were readdressed by the 
Supreme Court in 1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts.27  In Prince, a 
Jehovah’s Witness was convicted of violating child labor laws when she 
took her niece, whom was in the aunt’s custody, on a street mission 
distributing copies of religious periodicals.28  The aunt challenged her 
conviction as being a violation of her rights to direct the upbringing of the 
child in her custody, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and of 
the child’s religious freedoms, as guaranteed by the First Amendment.29  
The Court acknowledged parents have priority in the “custody, care and 
nurture of the child” and there is a “private realm of family life which the 
state cannot enter.”30  Despite reaffirming the fundamental right of parents 
to control their children, the Court acknowledged there are limits to this 
power when the public interest and the protection of children necessitate 
intervention.31  The Court ultimately upheld the conviction, finding the 
protection of children from the harms of preaching on a public street are of 
such a magnitude that the state was within its constitutional bounds to 
entirely prohibit such activity.32 
In 1968, the Court again upheld a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
criminal statute, attacked in part on parental rights grounds, in Ginsberg v. 
New York.33  The owner and operator of a Long Island store and deli 
 
24. See id. at 532 (noting the Society of Sisters complaint urged enjoinment of the Act on the 
basis of children’s rights to direct their own education and teachers to practice their occupation, in 
addition to parents’ rights to direct the education of their children). 
25. See Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 997-98. 
26. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.  See generally Woodhouse, supra note 16, for a scholarly 
argument that Meyer and Pierce are based on very conservative notions that children are the 
property of their parents. 
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
28. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159-60. 
29. Id. at 164. 
30. Id. at 166. 
31. Id. at 166-67. 
32. See id. at 170. 
33. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
          
2012] NOTE 241 
challenged his conviction under a state statute for selling an obscene 
magazine to a child, despite such magazine having been adjudicated to not 
be obscene for adults.34  Ginsberg argued, implicitly, the prohibition on 
such sales violates parents’ freedom to choose what materials their children 
can read.35  The Court rejected this argument, thus reinforcing the state’s 
role in protecting children from harms.36  The Court noted the New York 
Legislature used a rational law to advance this interest.37  The Court went 
even further and found the prohibition on sales of obscene materials to 
children enhanced parents’ control over their children’s upbringing.38 
Having moved away from parents’ interests as a priority in the 1940s to 
1960s, the Court reasserted a concern for parents as opposed to state 
interests in Stanley v. Illinois.39  In Stanley, the Supreme Court held a state 
cannot presume a father who is not married to his children’s mother should 
not have custody of his children when the mother dies.40  The Court, citing 
Meyer and Prince, found a father’s “interest in retaining custody of his 
children is cognizable and substantial.”41  The Court did not dispute that 
Illinois has a legitimate interest in ensuring children are cared for by fit 
parents, but the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit was not 
reasonable.42 
In the same year it decided Stanley, the Court reaffirmed parents’ rights 
to control his or her children’s upbringing, no matter how different from 
mainstream society, in Wisconsin v. Yoder.43  In Yoder, several Amish 
parents challenged their convictions of violating a Wisconsin statute 
 
34. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631-34.  The magazine that Ginsberg sold to the minor was a copy 
of Sir.  Id. at 634 n.3.  This same magazine was challenged as being obscene generally, and in a 
per curium opinion, the Supreme Court rejected such a finding.  Id. (citing Redrup v. New York, 
386 U.S. 767 (1967)).  In Redrup, a consolidated case, the Supreme Court reversed an Arkansas 
injunction in an in rem proceeding against the distribution of certain magazines, including Sir.  
Redrup, 386 U.S. at 769-70. 
35. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638-39.  Ginsberg’s main argument was that minors’ First 
Amendment rights were being violated since the material was not obscene when adults were 
concerned, and there could not be two standards of obscenity, one for adults and another for 
minors.  See id. at 636-37.  He also challenged the prohibition as being void because it was so 
vague that it does not give a possible violator fair warning as to what the statute prohibits.  Id. at 
643. 
36. Id. at 640-41. 
37. Id. at 643. 
38. See id. at 639 (noting this law support’s parents in ensuring children’s well-being and 
that parents can always choose to give the materials to their children, if the parent so decides). 
39. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
40. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
41. Id. at 652. 
42. See id. at 352-53 (“We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals 
when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.  Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the 
State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family.”). 
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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requiring attendance of children under sixteen in either a public or private 
school.44  The challengers believed sending their children, who were 
graduates of the eighth grade but not yet sixteen years old, to high school, 
would lead to damnation and violated their religious tenants.45  With regard 
to the rights of parents to control their children, the Court noted the 
educational choices made for children were for parents to decide, and, when 
there is a religious nature to the decision, it comes to be a “fundamental 
interest of parents.”46  The Court in Yoder articulated a higher standard of 
review for statutes tending to implicate parents’ religious choices for their 
children, but did not give a clear standard of what review is required.47 
The right of parents to the care and control of their children was 
recognized of requiring special procedural requirements in a parental rights 
termination proceeding in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services48 and 
Santosky v. Kramer.49  In Lassiter, the Court held a state was not required to 
provide an indigent parent appointed counsel in every instance, but in many 
instances, due process would require appointment of counsel, and trial 
judges should make such determination.50  In a stronger ruling than 
Lassiter, the Court in Santosky held a clear and convincing evidence burden 
of persuasion for the state was mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause in a parental rights termination proceeding.51  Since 
both of these decisions were about procedural rules concerning parental 
rights, they were not subjected to a rational basis, or other type of scrutiny 
used for substantive due process challenges, but rather, a balancing of 
interests test.52  Despite being focused on procedure, Santosky is probably 
 
44. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-09. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 214, 232. 
47. See id. at 233 (noting the statute at issue in Prince was upheld for being reasonable but 
“when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed 
by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of 
the State’ is required”). 
48. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
49. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
50. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. 
51. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. 
52. Id. at 754, 758 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Lassiter, 452 U.S. 
at 27).  In Eldridge, the Supreme Court reviewed a claimed violation of due process when the 
Social Security Administration’s procedures permitted termination of disability benefits prior to 
an evidentiary hearing.  424 U.S. at 349.  In evaluating a state’s chosen procedure,  
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct 
factors:  First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
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the strongest-worded articulation of parents’ substantive rights, describing 
them as a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child.”53 
The articulation of parental rights as fundamental is significant because 
fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.54  The standard requires the government 
to have a compelling interest for the action chosen, and its action must be 
narrowly tailored to implement that interest.55  Other rights not considered 
fundamental are subject to rational basis review, where the government 
only needs a legitimate interest and its actions only need to be rationally 
related to that interest.56  The determination of whether a right is really 
fundamental, and therefore the correct level of constitutional scrutiny to be 
applied, is key because the outcome of the case often depends on what level 
of scrutiny a court will use.57 
C. TROXEL SAYS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, BUT DOES THE SUPREME 
 COURT REALLY MEAN IT? 
The Supreme Court’s most recent consideration of a claimed violation 
of a parent’s rights over her children came in the year 2000, in Troxel v. 
Granville.58  There was no majority opinion issued in Granville, with a 
plurality opinion, two concurrences, and three dissents filed.59  The case 
involved a challenge to a Washington statute that provided a right for any 
person to petition the court for visitation with a child at any time, and 
required the court to order visitation if it would be in the best interest of the 
child.60  The dispute arose out of grandparents seeking court ordered 
visitation with their grandchildren after their former daughter-in-law 
 
Id. at 335. 
53. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
54. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). 
55. Id. 
56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
57. See David B. Howlett, Illegitimate Children and Military Benefits, 132 MIL. L. REV. 5, 
17 (1991).  At one point Justice Marshal endorsed a view of strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact.”  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).  
Subsequent Courts have disavowed using this view as analysis.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 326 (2003).  While not a use for analysis, the phrase still has descriptive weight. 
58. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
59. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59. 
60. Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).  The statute provided “[a]ny 
person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody 
proceedings.  The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the 
best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.”  WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3). 
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curtailed visitation following her ex-husband’s suicide.61  The state trial 
court awarded the grandparents visitation, the mother appealed, and 
eventually the Washington Supreme Court held the statute violated the 
United States Constitution, because it did not require a showing of harm to 
the child if visitation was not ordered; the statute was also found to be 
overbroad because there were no restrictions on who could petition for 
visitation.62 
Justice O’Connor authored the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justices Ginsberg and Breyer joined.63  The plurality 
described “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children [as] perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”64  However, the plurality was not consistent in 
its terminology, later in the opinion calling this interest a “fundamental 
right” of parents.65  The plurality upheld the Washington Supreme Court’s 
decision because the statute was “breathtakingly broad” and gave no weight 
to the decision of a fit parent.66  The plurality endorsed two presumptions 
concerning parental rights:  first, that a parent is fit until shown otherwise, 
and second, that a fit parent acts in his or her child’s best interests.67  
Significantly, the plurality specifically declined to hold, as the Washington 
Supreme Court had, the Due Process Clause requires a showing of harm, or 
potential harm, to the child prior to a third party being granted visitation.68  
The plurality did not want to create a “per se” rule for third party visitation 
“[b]ecause much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-
by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental 
visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.”69  
Thus, it is not clear what test – rational basis, strict scrutiny, or some 
intermediate – the plurality applied to invalidate this statute.70 
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment affirming the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision, but wrote separately because he argued the 
 
61. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61. 
62. Id. at 63 (citing In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-31 (Wash. 1998) (en banc)).  In 
re Custody of Smith was a consolidated case involving three separate constitutional challenges to 
the Washington statute.  969 P.2d at 23. 
63. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion). 
64. Id. at 65. 
65. Id. at 66. 
66. Id. at 67. 
67. See id. at 68-69. 
68. Id. at 73. 
69. Id. 
70. See id. (“We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due 
process right in the visitation context.”). 
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plurality justices went too far by analyzing the actual facts of the case.71  
Justice Souter noted the Washington Supreme Court held the visitation 
statute invalid on its face, and not in its application to any facts, finding the 
plurality’s factual analysis to be problematic “in the ‘treacherous field’ of 
substantive due process.”72  Despite this difference in approach, Justice 
Souter essentially found the same overbreadth problem, and, like the 
plurality, specifically declined to decide whether a showing of harm to the 
child is required to allow the state to infringe upon the parent-child 
relationship.73  Notably, Justice Souter did not use the word fundamental to 
describe a parent’s interest in controlling their children, and specifically 
noted the parental interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
clearly defined.74 
Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment, but would have 
invalidated the visitation statute as a violation of due process under the 
Court’s current due process precedent.75  Justice Thomas had the clearest 
articulation of the parental right at stake.76  He argued the right is 
fundamental, and as such, strict scrutiny applies to reviewing an 
infringement of that right.77  Despite Justice Thomas arguing strict scrutiny 
was the appropriate measure, he would have invalidated the statute if either 
rational basis review or strict scrutiny were applied, noting “the State of 
Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest – to say nothing 
of a compelling one – in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding 
visitation with third parties.”78 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy all filed dissenting opinions.79  
Justice Stevens would have denied certiorari in the first instance, but having 
decided the merits, would not have invalidated the statute on a facial 
challenge, since all applications of the statute would not be 
unconstitutional.80  Justice Stevens argued the typical case would likely be 
someone with a close relationship with the child seeking visitation and thus 
is not sufficient to hold a statute facially invalid.81  Further, Justice Stevens 
 
71. Id. at 75-76 (Souter, J., concurring). 
72. Id. at 76. 
73. Id. at 76-77. 
74. Id. at 77, 78-79. 
75. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas would hold that there are not 
unenumerated rights that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but recognizes that under 
the Court’s current due process analysis, this statute violates the Constitution.  See id. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 80, 91, 93. 
80. Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
81. Id. at 85. 
          
246 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:235 
argued a showing of harm has never been required to limit parental rights.82  
He also did not agree with the plurality’s presumption that a fit parent acts 
in the best interests of his or her children.83  Finally, Justice Stevens 
questioned how the constitutional rights of children should be weighed 
against the decisions that parents make concerning the child.84  Justice 
Stevens also called the interest of parents “a fundamental liberty interest in 
caring for and guiding their children.”85  However, he did not apply strict 
scrutiny analysis, and only limited his holding to the argument that the 
statute cannot be facially invalid.86 
Justice Scalia’s dissent generally attacked the idea of unenumerated 
rights under the Due Process Clause.87  He also noted the due process rights 
of parents were articulated in an era of substantive due process that has long 
been repudiated.88  Justice Scalia argued the definition of a “parent” can be 
slippery, and federal courts should avoid excursions into family law, which 
is the proper province of state legislatures.89 
Finally, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the holding of the Washington 
Supreme Court that a finding of harm must always be made in order for a 
third party to be granted visitation with a child over a parent’s objection.90  
He noted the best interest standard for visitation disputes has a long history 
and tradition as the basis for decision.91  Finding that being free from an 
application of the best interest standard in all third party custody cases is 
not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Justice Kennedy would not 
have held the Washington statute facially unconstitutional.92  This basis 
alone would have been sufficient for Justice Kennedy to remand the case to 
the Washington Supreme Court for a decision on the application of the 
statute to these facts.93 
Given the Supreme Court’s precedent concerning parental rights, there 
is no clear answer as to the scope and nature of the right, nor whether 
 
82. Id. at 85-86. 
83. See id. at 89 (“The constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with 
parental rights should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the 
arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of 
the child.”). 
84. Id. at 89. 
85. Id. at 87. 
86. Id. at 90-91. 
87. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 92 (citing West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)). 
89. Id. at 92-93. 
90. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 99. 
92. Id. at 100. 
93. Id. at 95, 101-02. 
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parental rights really are fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny.94  One 
commentator has noted that prior to Troxel, the nature of parental rights as 
fundamental, and subject to strict scrutiny, was firmly established, but 
following Troxel parental rights are not as firm.95  The majority of Justices 
in Troxel rejected applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the statute, and 
rather pointed towards a balancing of interests type of standard, which is 
wholly inconsistent with the Court’s prior approach to fundamental rights.96  
Thus, following Troxel, there is a good argument the proper standard for 
evaluating parental rights is a balancing of interests, and not an application 
of strict scrutiny.97 
The confusion of where parental rights fit within the Court’s 
constitutional precedent has prompted some in Congress to propose an 
amendment to the Constitution to provide “the liberty of parents to direct 
the upbringing and education of their children is a fundamental right” that 
can only be infringed when the government can show that its “interest as 
applied to the person is of the highest order and not otherwise served.”98  
The Court has also recently declined an invitation to clarify the two open 
questions left after Troxel.99  The Court was asked to determine (1) whether 
parental rights are fundamental and (2) whether a third party visitation 
statute has a showing of harm requirement.100 
III. NORTH DAKOTA’S THIRD PARTY CHILD CUSTODY LAWS 
North Dakota is in the minority of jurisdictions that recognize the 
placement of custody in a third party absent statutory authority.101  Many 
state courts have explicitly rejected awarding custody to a non-parent over a 
parent’s objection without some statutory authority to do so.102  This section 
first describes the areas where North Dakota has some statutory guidance, 
 
94. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of 
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 985-92 (1987) (questioning whether parental rights really 
are fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny). 
95. David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed:  Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1132-33, 1152-55 (2001). 
96. Id. at 1152-55. 
97. Id. 
98. H.R.J. Res. 97, 110th Cong. (2008).  The same amendment has been proposed in each 
subsequent Congress.  H.R.J. Res. 3, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 42, 111th Cong. (2009). 
99. E.R.G. v. E.H.G., 123 S. Ct. 1535 (2012) (No. 11-311) (denying certiorari). 
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, E.R.G. v. E.H.G., 123 S. Ct. 1535 (2012) (No. 11-
311), 2011 WL 4048829. 
101. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 32, 779 N.W.2d 652, 664 (Crothers, J., 
concurring). 
102. Id. ¶ 34, 779 N.W.2d at 665. 
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and then reviews some of the North Dakota case law developing a third 
party’s right to claim custody. 
A. SOME RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES ARE STATUTORY 
North Dakota’s laws on child custody are predominantly statutory.103  
Part 1 discusses the statutory rights grandparents have with regard to 
visitation in North Dakota.  Part 2 discusses other more ephemeral statutory 
rights that third parties have with regard to custody and visitation in North 
Dakota. 
1. Grandparent Visitation 
Grandparents and great-grandparents can petition for visitation with an 
unmarried minor child.104  To award visitation, the district court must find 
that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and not interfere 
with the parent-child relationship.105  North Dakota’s grandparent visitation 
statute is basically the same as was originally enacted in 1983,106 but it has 
not always been that way. 
In 1993, the Legislative Assembly significantly revised North Dakota’s 
grandparent visitation statute to provide a presumption that visitation is in 
the child’s best interests, and visitation will be denied only when it is shown 
to not be in the child’s best interests.107  In Hoff v. Berg,108 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court held this presumption was an infringement of due 
process.109  After reviewing the nature of parental rights, in both North 
Dakota and other jurisdictions, the court determined that controlling whom 
one’s child associates with is a parents’ fundamental right, and is to be 
reviewed under strict scrutiny.110  The court held the statute violated both 
the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions, because of the 
presumption in favor of visitation and the burden was on the parents to 
show visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship.111  The 
finding that parental interest in the care, custody, and control of their 
children is a fundamental right under the state constitution is significant 
 
103. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-09 (2009). 
104. Id. § 14-09-05.1(4). 
105. Id. § 14-09-05.1(1).  The best interest factors the court must consider are codified.  Id. § 
14-09-06.2. 
106. Compare 1983 N.D. Laws 486, with 2009 N.D. Laws 610-11. 
107. 1993 N.D. Laws 619. 
108. 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285. 
109. Hoff, ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92. 
110. Id., ¶¶ 14-17, 595 N.W.2d at 290-91. 
111. Id. ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92. 
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because “[t]he North Dakota Constitution may afford broader individual 
rights than those granted under its federal counterpart.”112  Thus, despite the 
apparent erosion of parental rights as “fundamental” in Troxel,113 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has reaffirmed that under the North Dakota 
Constitution parental rights are fundamental rights.114  The status of strict 
scrutiny being applied to this fundamental right, however, is unclear 
because the North Dakota Supreme Court has not addressed the question 
since Hoff. 
2. Aunt, Uncle, and Grandparent Temporary Custody Pending 
 Adoption and Domestic Violence Placement 
North Dakota statutory law also provides for the placement of custody 
with different family members pending an adoption.115  All other 
assignments of parental rights by a parent without court order are void.116  
Third-party custody is also authorized when it is necessary to protect the 
welfare of a child that has been exposed to serious domestic violence.117  
Again, there is a preference, though not a requirement, that this third party 
be a suitable relative of the child.118 
B. MOST CLAIMS OF THIRD PARTIES TO CUSTODY ARE 
 JUDICIALLY CREATED 
North Dakota recognizes that when exceptional circumstances are 
present, a third party can make a claim for custody of a child, 
notwithstanding the constitutional claims that a parent has to the child.119  
The exceptional circumstances justify granting the third party custody is to 
prevent harm to the child.120  Exceptional circumstances have been 
recognized in three different cases:  claims by grandparent-caregivers, 
claims by stepparents, and claims by voluntarily appointed guardians.121 
  
 
112. State v. Mittleider, 2011 ND 242, ¶ 16, 809 N.W.2d 303, 308. 
113. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
114. Hartlieb v. Simes, 2009 ND 205, ¶ 20, 776 N.W.2d 217, 224.  The erosion of this right 
might not be recognized by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  See id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000)) (“It is undisputed that parents have a fundamental right to the custody 
and control of their children.”). 
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-05 (2009). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j). 
118. Id. 
119. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 14, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658. 
120. Id. 
121. See discussion infra Part III.B.1-3. 
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1. Grandparental Custody Actions Not Based on 
 Statutory Authority 
Many of the cases in North Dakota regarding the placement of custody 
with a third party, over a parent’s objection, involved grandparents who had 
taken the responsibility to care for their grandchildren with the consent of at 
least one of the parents.122  In McKay v. Mitzel,123 a father petitioned for 
custody of his children following the death of his ex-wife.124  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed granting custody to the maternal 
grandparents, finding this arrangement to be in the best interests of the 
children because the grandparents had provided care for the children in the 
grandparents’ home, and the children preferred to remain there.125 
In a similar case, the North Dakota Supreme Court granted 
grandparents custody of their grandson, in large part because the 
grandparents had formed a strong bond with their grandson during the 
father’s absence.126  The North Dakota Supreme Court held the proper 
standard was the best interest of the child, and continuity in the child’s 
custody would best serve him.127  The court recognize the grandfather was 
the only “father” this child had ever known.128  The court took note of 
recent literature on the best interests of the child, and found the 
grandparents were the child’s “psychological parents”:  the person who has 
shared memories with and who the child feels valued by.129  Accordingly, 
the court reversed the trial court’s award of custody to the boy’s father, and 
restored it to the grandparents.130  Throughout the cases in North Dakota 
involving third party claims for custody, a vast majority involve 
grandparents seeking the custody of their grandchildren following a 
parent’s absence or death.131 
 
122. See McAllister, ¶ 31, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662-63 (Crothers, J., concurring). 
123. 137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965). 
124. McKay, 137 N.W.2d at 793.  At the time the procedure was to file a writ of habeas 
corpus to have the child’s custody determined when the parent who had physical and legal custody 
had died.  Id. at 793-94. 
125. Id. at 793-95. 
126. In re Custody of D.G., 246 N.W.2d 892, 893-94 (N.D. 1976). 
127. Id. at 895.  The court did not discuss any constitutional issues with this standard.  Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
(1973)). 
130. Id. at 895-96. 
131. See McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 31, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662-63 (Crothers, J, 
concurring) (surveying cases). 
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2. Stepparents Can Petition for Custody if They Are 
 Psychological Parents 
Another occurrence where claims of a third party arise is when a 
stepparent claims custody over a child’s biological parent.  In Worden v. 
Worden,132 the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the award of custody 
of a stepdaughter to her stepfather in a divorce between the mother and 
stepfather.133  The district court had found exceptional circumstances 
justified awarding the stepfather custody, because the mother’s life was 
unstable and the child’s biological father did not visit her.134  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed, finding there was no evidence the 
stepfather had become the psychological parent of the child given the short 
time the couple was married, only two years, developing such a bond was 
unlikely.135  The court noted “each case in which such a placement has been 
upheld by this court has involved a child who has been in the actual 
physical custody of the third party for a sufficient period of time to develop 
a psychological parent relationship with that third party.”136  In In re 
Guardianship and Conservatorship of Nelson,137 a stepparent figure was 
awarded custody, despite never having been married to the child’s father.138  
Most recently, the same doctrine that has been used to award custody of a 
stepchild to a stepparent has been invoked to allow a court to order 
visitation when there is a psychological parent relationship, despite custody 
not being found to be in the best interests of the child.139 
3. Other Exceptional Circumstance Cases 
The only other area where the North Dakota Supreme Court has found 
an exceptional circumstance warranting a custody award in someone other 
than a natural or adoptive parent is when a parent voluntarily places his or 
her child into a guardianship with another person.  In In re Guardianship of 
 
132. 434 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1989). 
133. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 341-43. 
134. Id. at 342. 
135. Id. at 343. 
136. Id. at 342-43. 
137. 519 N.W.2d 15 (N.D. 1994). 
138. In re Nelson, 519 N.W.2d at 19-20.  The petitioner in Nelson was the live-in girlfriend 
of the child’s father.  Id. at 16.  They had been living together for four years, including the father’s 
two children from a previous marriage and the girlfriend’s three children from a previous 
relationship.  Id.  Over this time the girlfriend did not work, but rather provided the daily care for 
all of the couple’s children.  Id.  The guardianship became necessary because the father had died.  
Id. 
139. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶¶ 16, 20, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658-60; Edwards v. 
Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶¶ 10-11, 777 N.W.2d 606, 609-10. 
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Barros,140 the North Dakota Supreme Court held a voluntarily created 
guardianship is, as a matter of law, an exceptional circumstance permitting 
the district court to begin with a best interest analysis when the parent seeks 
to terminate the guardianship and the guardian opposes termination.141  The 
majority held the proper standard for the removal of a guardianship of a 
minor is that the parent initially prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
the reasons justifying the guardianship in the first place are no longer 
valid.142  Once this has been shown, the guardian opposing the termination 
must show continuation of the guardianship is in the best interests of the 
child.143  The court specifically rejected the application of a clear and 
convincing evidence standard to the best interest analysis, because the 
parental rights had not been fully infringed upon with the creation, and 
possible continuation, of the guardianship.144 
Justice Kapsner dissented from the court’s holding that a 
preponderance burden is the appropriate measure for continuing a 
guardianship against a parent’s wishes.145  Justice Kapsner believed a 
suspension of parental rights, which appointment of and continuation of a 
guardianship accomplishes, is more akin to a termination of parental rights 
and, as such, would apply a clear and convincing evidence standard.146  In a 
subsequent case involving the same issue, Justice Kapsner did not dispute 
that a preponderance standard was appropriate for the best interest 
analysis.147 
IV. A PROPOSED STATUTE TO CLARIFY NORTH DAKOTA’S 
THIRD PARTY CUSTODY LAW 
North Dakota has a strong preference for setting policy through the 
Legislative Assembly rather than through the court system.148  North 
Dakota judges and justices also prefer to not set policy, but rather defer to 
elected officials where possible.149  This Part looks at particular issues that 
are calling for legislative attention in North Dakota.  Part A shows where 
some ambiguity lies in current North Dakota third party custody law.  Part 
 
140. 2005 ND 122, 701 N.W.2d 402. 
141. In re Barros, ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d at 409. 
142. Id. ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d at 408. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. ¶¶ 16-19. 
145. Id. ¶ 26, 701 N.W.2d at 410 (Kapsner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
146. Id. ¶ 28, 701 N.W.2d at 411. 
147. Hartleib v. Simes, 2009 ND 205, ¶¶ 21-22, 48, 776 N.W.2d 217, 224, 231. 
148. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 01-02-01 (2008). 
149. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 35, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, J., 
concurring). 
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B looks at other states’ legislative approaches to third party custody.  Part C 
analyzes the American Law Institute’s approach to third party custody.  
Finally, Part D makes some suggestions on how North Dakota could 
approach some of the issues in its current third party custody law via 
legislation. 
A. ASPECTS OF NORTH DAKOTA’S LAW THAT NEED CLARIFICATION 
There are several aspects to North Dakota’s judicially crafted law 
surrounding third party custody claims that is unclear and could benefit 
from statutory guidance.  First, as shown by the disagreement between the 
majority and the dissent in In re Barros, the question of the appropriate 
burden of persuasion is a significant issue when the government is using its 
authority to contravene the wishes of a fit parent.150  Though the North 
Dakota Supreme Court ruled the burden on the third party is a 
preponderance of the evidence when the best interests of the child are being 
determined, there is also another burden of persuasion issue at play in third-
party custody cases.151  The third party must show there are exceptional 
circumstances that justify a best interest analysis, and under current case 
law, this burden is by a preponderance of the evidence.152 
Second, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated preventing harm 
to the child is a predicate to awarding custody to a third party, but it is not 
clear whether the concern for harm is to be evaluated in determining if 
exceptional circumstances exist, or when considering the best interests of 
the child.153  In McAllister v. McAllister,154 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court wrote that the exceptional circumstances were only a predicate to 
conducting the best interest analysis when the prevention of harm to the 
child was to be evaluated.155  In Edwards v. Edwards,156 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held granting visitation with a stepfather was appropriate 
 
150. See In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶¶ 13-18, 701 N.W.2d at 407-09; id. ¶¶ 26-28, 701 
N.W.2d at 410-11 (Kapsner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
151. See, e.g., Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, ¶ 9, 610 N.W.2d 758, 761; see also 
McAllister, ¶ 37, 779 N.W.2d at 666 (Crothers, J., concurring). 
152. Hamers, ¶ 9, 610 N.W.2d at 761; McAllister, ¶ 37, 779 N.W.2d at 666. 
153. See Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶ 11, 777 N.W.2d 606, 610. 
154. 2010 ND 40, 779 N.W.2d 652. 
155. See McAllister, ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (“Establishment of a psychological parent 
relationship does not end the trial court’s inquiry in making a custody decision, but merely 
furnishes a justification for the award of custody to a party other than the natural parent. . . . [T]he 
natural parent's paramount right to custody prevails unless the court finds it in the child's best 
interests to award custody to the psychological parent to prevent serious harm or detriment to the 
welfare of the child.”). 
156. 2010 ND 2, 777 N.W.2d 606. 
          
254 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:235 
because the requirement to prevent harm arises from the exceptional 
circumstances themselves.157 
Also troubling is the constitutional issue of the harm requirement.158  
As noted above, a harm requirement has not been decided to be 
constitutionally mandatory by the United States Supreme Court.159  
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has determined a finding of 
harm or serious detriment is necessary to award custody to a third party 
over a fit parent.160  Yet the North Dakota Supreme Court did not require 
any type of harm or detriment showing on the part of a guardian when a 
parent seeks to terminate the guardianship.161  Thus, despite the harm 
requirement being a constitutional mandate in North Dakota,162 a court-
appointed guardian does not need to show harm or detriment to the child 
that would occur from ending the guardianship.163  Such a harm or 
detriment requirement is required under the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decisions because the state only has a compelling interest 
when the child’s well-being is threatened, and for the termination of 
guardianships, it is not now required in North Dakota.164 
Finally, the largest need for clarification is the standing of third parties 
to bring a claim following recent amendments to North Dakota’s child 
custody statutes.  Under North Dakota law, standing is a question of the 
courts’ jurisdiction to determine the case before it.165  In 2009, the North 
Dakota Legislative Assembly repealed and replaced a significant portion of 
North Dakota Century Code chapter 14-09.166  Specifically, the Legislative 
Assembly changed terminology to be used in child custody proceedings, 
defined terms, and repealed the prior “best interests” section, replacing it 
with updated factors for a court to consider.167  All of these new definitions 
 
157. See Edwards, ¶ 11, 777 N.W.2d at 610 (“[I]n some cases exceptional circumstances 
may require [visitation], in a child's best interests and in order to prevent serious harm or 
detriment to the child.”). 
158. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
159. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
160. See In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203, 206 (N.D. 1982). 
161. See In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d 402, 409; see also Hartlieb v. Simes, 
2009 ND 205, ¶¶ 25-26, 776 N.W.2d 217, 226 (affirming the district court’s findings that 
guardianship should be terminated by only looking at best interest factors with no determination 
about whether guardianship should continue to avoid harm to the child). 
162. See In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d at 206. 
163. See Hartlieb, ¶¶ 20-23, 776 N.W.2d at 224-25. 
164. See id., ¶¶ 25-26, 776 N.W.2d at 226; Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶¶ 15-16, 595 
N.W.2d 285, 290-91. 
165. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Cnty. Farm Bureau, 2004 ND 60, ¶ 11, 676 N.W.2d 752, 
757-58. 
166. 2009 N.D. Laws 609-22. 
167. Id. at 611, 614-16, 621; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (2009). 
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specifically contemplate parents being the ones that are contesting custody 
and subject to a court’s custody order.168  Significant for third party claims, 
the concept formerly known as custody is now known as primary residential 
responsibility, which is defined as “a parent with more than fifty percent of 
the residential responsibility.”169 
Despite using the term “parent” throughout section 14-09-00.1, the 
Legislative Assembly failed to define the term “parent” in the section, or 
anywhere else in chapter 14-09.  Under rules of statutory construction, 
words are to be given their plain ordinary meaning unless defined in the 
statutes.170  Definitions from other chapters in the North Dakota Century 
Code are to be used to construe later undefined terms,171 unless the 
Legislative Assembly has made plain the definition only applies to a 
particular chapter or title.172  All definitions of “parent” in the North Dakota 
Century Code only apply to the chapter where they are located.173  Since 
there are no general definitions in the North Dakota Century Code for 
“parent” we must presume the Legislative Assembly used the term in its 
ordinary meaning.174 
The ordinary meaning of parent denotes a child’s biological parents.175  
A common definition of parent is “one that begets or brings forth 
offspring.”176  This general definition of parent, in terms of natural parents, 
fits well with the intent of the drafters of the definitions in North Dakota’s 
child custody statute.177  Thus, in adopting the new language defining the 
contours of parental rights and responsibilities, it would be presumed the 
Legislative Assembly did not include psychological parents in with those 
terms.178  Since the new definitions were adopted for child custody in 2009, 
there has been no clear answer on whether those definitions exclude 
 
168. See 2009 N.D. Laws 611; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-00.1(2)-(7). 
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-00.1(6).  Residential responsibility “means a parent's 
responsibility to provide a home for the child.”  Id. § 14-09-00.1(7). 
170. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02. 
171. Id. § 1-01-09. 
172. Edinger v. Governing Auth. of the Stutsman Cnty. Corr. Ctr. & Law Enforcement Ctr., 
2005 ND 79, ¶ 16, 695 N.W.2d 447, 452. 
173. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-01, 14-15.1-01, 14-19-01, 30.1-04-14. 
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-09. 
175. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1510 (2002). 
176. Id. 
177. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, N.D. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE NORTH 
DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 209-14 (2008) (stating concerns with custody in divorce 
proceedings prompted a review of North Dakota custody law). 
178. See id. (mentioning parents, but never a third party claim besides grandparent visitation 
claims). 
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psychological parents, and it is no longer clear if any third party could bring 
a claim for custody.179 
There are also constitutional issues with the current law surrounding 
third party custody in North Dakota.  In Troxel, the plurality, along with 
Justices Thomas, Stevens, and Souter held there is a substantive due process 
presumption that fit parents act in their child’s best interests, and this 
presumption must be rebutted in order for a court to contravene those 
wishes.180  Under current North Dakota case law, no special weight is given 
to a parent’s decision concerning the custody of his or her child.181  By only 
using a preponderance of the evidence standard, no special weight is given 
by the court to a parent’s decisions that custody or visitation with a third 
party is inappropriate, and therefore, the current case law in North Dakota 
violates parent’s rights under Troxel.182 
Another constitutional concern present is the interference that litigation 
between a parent and a third party over child custody can have on the 
parent-child relationship.183  Currently, any third party that can show a 
strong bond with a child can petition for custody or visitation in North 
Dakota, triggering litigation that will be time consuming and likely require 
expert witnesses.184  A parent would likely require expert witness testimony 
to rebut a third party’s claim of psychological parent status and custody 
with the third party is necessary to prevent harm to the child.185  North 
Dakota statutory law also requires parents to pay for custody investigators 
and guardians ad litem, if appointed.186  Given the time necessary to defend 
a claim from a third party, and the expense that can be incurred in court, 
 
179. Both Edwards and McAllister were decided in the North Dakota Supreme Court in 
2010, but the pre-amended custody statute was the law in issue because the cases were tried prior 
to the amendments becoming effective.  McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 1 n.1, 779 
N.W.2d 652, 654 n.1; Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶ 3, 777 N.W.2d 606, 607-08. 
180. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-70 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 77-79 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
181. See In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶¶ 26-28, 701 N.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Kapsner, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
182. See id. 
183. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (plurality opinion) (stating litigating claims themselves can 
become so burdensome as to infringe a parent’s constitutional rights); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
184. See Cox v. Cox, 2000 ND 144, ¶ 23, 613 N.W.2d 516, 522 (affirming award of custody 
to natural father, in part, based on the lack of expert testimony showing a psychological parent 
bond between child and third parties).  While Cox, involved a lack of expert testimony, a parent 
who faces adverse expert witness testimony will run a serious risk of not finding his or her own 
expert to rebut that testimony.  See Clark v. Clark, 2006 ND 182, ¶¶ 6-10, 20, 721 N.W.2d 6, 10-
11, 14 (affirming, in a divorce case, both the exclusion of father’s expert witnesses from trial, 
because of late disclosure, and that there was sufficient evidence in record for changing custody). 
185. See Cox, ¶ 23, 613 N.W.2d at 522. 
186. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06.3(4), 14-09-06.4 (2009). 
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attorney, expert witness, custody investigator, and guardian ad litem fees, a 
parent might be reluctant to assert his or her parental rights.187  As a 
majority of Justices said in Troxel, the burden of preserving parental rights 
in litigation might be a constitutional violation.188  It may well prompt a 
parent to settle, and allow custody or visitation to be granted to a third 
party, when the parent otherwise would not have agreed.189 
B. OTHER STATES’ STATUTORY SOLUTIONS 
Due to the high degree of policy choice inherent in delineating parental 
rights and the questionable constitutionality of infringing upon them, many 
state legislatures have chosen to proscribe by statute the availability of third 
party custody claims.190  Many courts have also chosen to not recognize a 
third party claim to custody absent an authorizing statute.191  Of the states 
that have adopted legislation on the topic, two stand out. 
1. Minnesota’s Third Party Custody Statute 
In 2002, the Minnesota Legislature enacted statutory provisions to 
regulate the types of third parties who can petition for custody and 
visitation, along with what procedures they must follow to be granted an 
award.192  Minnesota law distinguishes between third parties who have been 
providing care for a child in that person’s home without a parent present, 
called de facto parents,193 and all other third parties who might be interested 
in the child’s custody.194  A de facto parent must show he or she has been 
the primary caretaker for the child in the person’s home for two years, and 
the parent has not had meaningful contact with the child for a significant 
amount of time.195  An interested person is one who can show that the 
parent has neglected the child to an extent the child will be harmed if living 
with his or her parent, or presence of physical or emotional harm to the 
 
187. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (plurality opinion); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(same). 
188. Id. at 75; id. at 101. 
189. See id. at 75; id. at 101.  In North Dakota this danger is all the more real, as there is 
often required mediation as a condition of going to trial in family law cases.  See N.D. CENT. 
CODE ch. 14-09.1; N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER 17 (2011). 
190. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 33, 779 N.W.2d 652, 665 (Crothers, 
J., concurring) (surveying authority). 
191. See id. ¶ 34, 779 N.W.2d at 665-66. 
192. 2002 Minn. Laws 429-36, 444.  The sections concerning voluntary placement with a 
third party by a parent and petitions for visitation were not newly adopted.  Id. 444. 
193. MINN. STAT. § 257C.01, subdivs. 2-3 (2012). 
194. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 7. 
195. Id. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2(a)(1)-(2).  The two years must have elapsed with the child in 
the de facto parent’s care before filing any petition for custody.  Id. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2(b). 
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child trumps preserving the parent-child relationship.196  If the sworn 
petition in the action is not supported by enough factual allegations made 
by the de facto custodian or interested party, the court must dismiss the 
action prior to holding an evidentiary hearing.197  Both the de facto 
custodian and the interested person must show their status by clear and 
convincing evidence at trial to be granted custody.198  The status of a non-
grandparent seeking visitation in Minnesota must also be established by 
clear and convincing evidence.199  Despite the higher burden for showing 
status, the preponderance of the evidence is only required of the de facto 
custodian or interested party to show the best interests of the child would be 
served by placing custody of the child with them.200 
2. California’s Third Party Custody Statute 
Like Minnesota, in 2002, the California Legislature significantly 
amended its prior third-party custody statute to define the situations when a 
third party can be granted custody over a parent.201  Like Minnesota, 
California requires a parent be awarded custody over a nonparent unless 
harm or detriment to the child from being placed with the parent would 
result.202  This harm must be shown by the third party, by clear and 
convincing evidence.203  However, if the third party can show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the child has been living with the third party 
for a substantial time in a parental role, then there is a rebuttable 
presumption that custody being granted to the parent would be harmful.204  
There is no definite time period required, as there is in Minnesota.205  The 
 
196. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 7(a)(1)(i)-(iii). 
197. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 2; In re M.R.P.-C., 794 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
198. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03, subdiv. 6(a)(1), subdiv. 7(a)(1). 
199. Id. § 257C.08, subdiv. 4; SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2007).  
SooHoo also held that the placement on the parent to show that any visitation would interfere with 
the parent-child relationship is unconstitutional because it does not give special weight to a fit 
parent’s decision on visitation.  731 N.W.2d at 824. 
200. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03, subdiv. 6(a)(2), subdiv. 7(a)(2). 
201. 2002 Cal. Stat. 7177.  There were amendments in 2006 as well that clarified how the 
law applied to Indian children.  2006 Cal. Stat. 6541-42. 
202. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a) (Deering Supp. 2012). 
203. Id. § 3041(b). 
204. Id. § 3041(c)-(d).  One California court has stated that the presumption is not 
inconsistent with the clear and convincing evidence standard because the presumed fact is that 
clear and convincing evidence exists that placement with the parent would be a detriment to the 
child, and is not an elimination of the clear and convincing evidence standard.  H.S. v. N.S., 93 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 470, 476 (Ct. App. 2009). 
205. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(c), with MINN. STAT. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2. 
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parent can rebut the presumption by showing that harm would not result, by 
a preponderance of the evidence.206 
C. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES 
The American Law Institute developed principles to apply to family 
law, including divorce, support, and child custody and visitation, through 
the 1990s, with the promulgation of the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION on May 16, 2000.207  The PRINCIPLES define third 
parties, with regard to child custody, as de facto parents.208 The PRINCIPLES 
also delineate how custody should be apportioned among parents as a 
default.209  The relative time given to custody petitioners generally follows 
the percentage of time that a parent spent caring for the child.210  For 
disputes between legal parents and de facto parents, the PRINCIPLES favor a 
fit parent unless that fit parent has not been providing for the child, or the 
child would be harmed by favoring the parent.211  There is no indication 
what burden of proof is required to show a person is a de facto parent, or 
that placing the child with a parent is not presumed.212  The definitions and 
scheme embodied in the PRINCIPLES does not comport with the current 
articulations of natural parents’ constitutional rights.213  Due to this 
deficiency, the PRINCIPLES would not really provide a good stepping stone 
for a statutory solution in North Dakota.214  While the recognition that daily 
tasks concerning a child are important,215 the fulfillment of only a majority 
of these functions should not lead to a presumption of custody for a third 
party, but rather the quality of the relationship is what matters.216 
 
206. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(d).  The use of the presumption by the Legislature did not 
violate the parent’s constitutional due process rights.  H.S., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 476-77. 
207. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, at xiii-xiv (2002). 
208. Id. § 2.03(1)(c). 
209. Id. § 2.08(1). 
210. Id.  Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson critiques the Principles on the ground that the 
caretaking and de facto parent requirements are so lax and do not give proper weight to parents, 
primarily mothers.  Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers:  A Critique of the American Law 
Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1118-20 (2010).  Professor 
Wilson argues that the Principles actually make it easier for child molesters to gain custodial 
rights to their victims and are rewarded in a third party custody action based on their behaviors 
with the victims that groom the child for the abuse.  Id. 
211. AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, § 2.18. 
212. See id. 
213. David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of 
Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1085-88 (2001). 
214. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
215. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, §§ 2.03(5), 2.08(1). 
216. See Wilson, supra note 210, at 1135. 
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D. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
The North Dakota Legislative Assembly should endorse a view long-
espoused in North Dakota, that the pursuit of happiness as guaranteed in the 
North Dakota Constitution,217 includes a right of parents to be free from 
unwarranted governmental interference in their families.218  In recognition 
of this place of parental rights, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly 
should adopt legislation that provides standing to third party petitioners.219  
The Legislative Assembly also needs to create a process to prevent parents 
from being drawn into lengthy litigation, and thereby infringe their parental 
rights.220  Finally, the Legislative Assembly should require a third party to 
bear the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that he or 
she is, both a proper person to have custody, and that custody with the third 
party is required to prevent harm or serious detriment to the child.  For any 
visitation granted to a third party, the third party should be required to show 
that visitation will not interfere with the parent-child relationship. 
1. North Dakota’s Standing Solution by Defining Parenthood for 
 Child Custody Actions 
As custody is currently defined in North Dakota, a parent-child 
relationship is assumed.221  One solution to grant standing to a third party to 
seek custody would be to define the term “parent” for the purposes of child 
custody.222  Thus, by defining parent in a manner that includes third parties 
who can appropriately meet the other requirements of a newly adopted 
statute, they would thereby have standing to bring a claim for custody.223  It 
would also give context and meaning to the frequent use of the term 
“parent” throughout North Dakota Century Code chapter 14-09.224 
2. The Need to Insulate Parents from Marginal 
 Third Party Claims 
As a majority of Justices recognized in Troxel, the litigation of a claim 
can pose a large obstacle, even a constitutional concern, for a parent, and 
 
217. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
218. Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 10, 595 N.W.2d 285, 289 (citing State v. Cromwell, 9 
N.W.2d 914, 919 (N.D. 1943)). 
219. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
220. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text. 
221. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
222. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, § 2.03(1) (stating that for the purposes of the child 
custody section of the Principles the definition of parent includes a de facto parent). 
223. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
224. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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could lead to parents feeling coerced by their circumstances to permit their 
parental rights to be invaded where they otherwise would not have done 
so.225  In light of this concern, a procedure should be adopted to weed out 
non-meritorious third party custody claims early in litigation.226  Minnesota 
requires all third party petitions for custody to be sworn to by the party 
bringing the action, and the case must be dismissed if insufficient facts are 
pled to show that a third party fits the statutory definitions of persons with 
standing to pursue the claim.227  All of these facts are taken as true to 
determine this status.228 
North Dakota should adopt a requirement similar to Minnesota’s 
verified petition.  However, given the special constitutional issue at stake, 
instead of presuming the allegations in an affidavit are true, North Dakota 
should require the third party petitioner to schedule a hearing where cross-
examination is permitted to determine the claims of the third party.  This 
should be done early enough in the litigation, perhaps after sixty days 
following commencement of the suit, and prior to conducting significant 
discovery, so that neither the parents or the petitioners will have expended 
large amounts of time and money.229  The hearing should be required prior 
to any referral to a mediation program or appointment by the court of a 
guardian ad litem or parenting investigator.230 
3. The Third Party Should Need to Prove His or Her Case by 
 Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Given the parental rights at stake, North Dakota should make a third 
party seeking custody over the objection of a parent a heavy burden.  Many 
legislatures and several courts have found a clear and convincing evidence 
standard protects children and respects parents’ fundamental rights.231  
North Dakota should follow suit and ensure parental rights are upheld 
unless it is clearly shown there is a greater harm to the child. 
 
225. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (plurality opinion) (stating litigating claims 
themselves can become so burdensome as to infringe a parent’s constitutional rights); id. at 101 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same). 
226. See In re M.R.P.-C., 794 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. This procedure is already common in family law cases in North Dakota, and would not 
require significant adjustment in the practice of the bench and bar.  See N.D. CT. R. 8.3 (2011). 
230. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06.3(1), 14-09-06.4 (2009) (permitting court to appoint 
custody investigator and guardian ad litem, at either request of a party or on its own motion). 
231. See discussion supra Parts IV.B. 
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Minnesota requires a third party to show the child’s best interests 
would be served by only a preponderance of the evidence.232  California 
does not have a best interest requirement, rather couching the justification 
for placing the child with the third party in terms of harm prevention.233  
California also requires a prevention of harm to the child to be shown by 
clear and convincing evidence.234 
North Dakota should follow the lead of California and be explicit that 
the third party must show by clear and convincing evidence that placement 
of the child with the child’s parent would be a detriment to the child.  To 
ensure the third party is an appropriate person to have custody, North 
Dakota should follow Minnesota’s lead and require a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the third party has a proper relationship with the 
child.235  However, North Dakota should not apply the interested party 
status as defined in Minnesota, as it only collapses the harm requirement.236  
Rather, the de facto parent definition properly fits with a current conception 
of who is currently entitled to bring an action in North Dakota.237  In order 
to give both courts and litigants clear guidance about which third parties 
can bring an action,238 the specific time frames used by Minnesota in 
defining a de facto parent should be adopted, as well.239  Finally, having 
clear guidance about when a parent has not taken an appropriate role in the 
care of his or her children, as embodied in the list of caregiving tasks and 
parenting task as defined in the Principles,240 would likewise give clear 
guidance on what things a parent needs to take care of in order to avoid a 
third party custody claim. 
4. A Third Party Granted Only Visitation Must Show 
 that Visitation Will Not Interfere with 
 the Parent-Child Relationship 
Currently, the only third parties that are statutorily entitled to bring an 
action for visitation in North Dakota are grandparents and great-
 
232. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03, subdiv. 6(a)(2), subdiv. 7(a)(2) (2012). 
233. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a) (Deering Supp. 2012). 
234. Id. 
235. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03 subdiv. 6(a)(1), subdiv. 7(a)(1). 
236. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 7(a)(1). 
237. See McAllister v. McAllister, 20100 ND 40, ¶¶ 14-15, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (defining 
“psychological parent”); In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶ 18, 701 N.W.2d 402, 408-09. 
238. See McAllister, ¶ 37, 779 N.W.2d at 666 (Crothers, J., dissenting) (noting development 
of third party claims through case law does not give parties, courts, or attorneys much guidance on 
the subject). 
239. MINN. STAT. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2(a)-(c). 
240. AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, § 2.03(5)-(6). 
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grandparents.241  Since the Legislative Assembly has chosen to allow 
grandparents and great-grandparents this right only on a preponderance of 
the evidence, a similar right for other third parties to request visitation 
should be allowed.  As visitation is a lesser intrusion into the parent-child 
relationship than custody, having only a preponderance of the evidence 
standard does not necessarily implicate the same constitutional concerns as 
when custody is at issue.242  Non-grandparent third parties should still be 
required to prove their relationship with the child by clear and convincing 
evidence, however.  The grandparental statute only requires that the best 
interest analysis show that visitation should apply, and as such, the same 
standard should apply to those third parties that can show a proper 
relationship to the child. 
One critique leveled at the PRINCIPLES, which could grant significant 
visitation rights with third parties, is that a third party receiving visitation 
would not be required to pay any kind of child support.243  Normally, a 
parent has both rights and responsibilities to a child, but under the 
PRINCIPLES, and possibly under current North Dakota law, third parties 
granted visitation have no responsibility to provide support to the child.244  
Currently, grandparents are not subject to pay child support for their 
grandchildren when granted visitation, and it is not clear if third parties 
would be obligated to pay child support.245  Stepparents are required to 
support their stepchildren while a part of the stepparent’s family,246 but this 
obligation ceases when the stepparent and parent divorce.247  North Dakota 
should recognize if third parties wish to gain rights to a child, they should 
also bear responsibilities to that child.  At a minimum, the third party, or 
grandparent for that matter, should be required to bear a majority of the 
expenses incurred in exercising visitation.248 
 
241. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2009). 
242. See Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶ 8, 777 N.W.2d 606, 609. 
243. Wilson, supra note 210, at 1114-15.  Professor Wilson argues that requiring third 
parties to be at risk of paying child support if granted visitation serves an important screening 
process to ensure that only sufficiently invested third parties seek custody or visitation.  Id. at 
1114 n.70. 
244. Id. at 1114-15; McAllister, ¶¶ 3, 8-10, 779 N.W.2d 652, 655-57. 
245. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, ¶¶ 30-32, 52, 617 N.W.2d 97, 107-08, 111-12 
(holding that only parents who equitably adopt a child is required to pay child support).  There is 
not really a question that a parent would have to pay child support to a third party.  N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-09-09.10(12). 
246. N.D. CENT CODE § 14-09-09. 
247. See Johnson, ¶ 31, 617 N.W.2d at 107. 
248. See N.D. ADMIN CODE § 74-02-04.1-09(2)(j) (2011) (allowing deviation from child 
support guideline amount for obligor who is required to bear all the expenses of court ordered 
parenting time). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
North Dakota cases have carved out a unique place for psychological 
parents to gain custody of children they have neither legally adopted or 
parented in the biological sense.249  Given the nature of creating policy 
through case law, parents and third parties who would seek custody have 
many unanswered questions.250  Considering the further complication in the 
United States Supreme Court’s language articulating parental rights, the 
North Dakota Legislative Assembly should enact legislation to give clear 
guidance to judges, parents, and third party caregivers about who can 
petition for custody and what that person would have to prove.251  This 
guidance will hopefully lead to clearer court decisions and decreased 
litigation, all in the best interests of North Dakota’s children. 
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249. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
250. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶¶ 36-37, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, J., 
concurring). 
251. Id.; see discussion supra Part II.C. 
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